Tag: SMR

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Good Energy Policy Is Technology-Agnostic

On January 6, the Energy, Utilities, and Technology (EUT) Committee of the Maine Legislature debated amendments to a bill that would require the PUC to obtain “informational bids” on small modular reactors (SMRs) for use in Maine. The bill was rejected by the majority and amended to require the Department of Energy Resources to carefully assess the commercial readiness of all emerging energy technologies for use in the State Energy Plan. SMRs are just one of many technically feasible technologies that are not yet commercial. and that list of possibile technologies will change over time as some drop off and others are added. Statutes need to be durable, and the choice of technology-agnostic language is essential. However, the debate in the EUT focused on the inclusion of the word “nuclear” and the presumption on the part of the minority members that SMRs are indeed the frontrunners among emerging technologies. Some might see the majority’s action as driven by anti-nuclear ideology. Nothing could be further from the truth. and taking that view misses a fundamental difference about energy sources in Maine – we are buyers of the output of power plants owned and operated by third parties, which purchase equipment from manufacturers. Here’s why that makes a difference.

There was considerable discussion about the activities of other states and provinces regarding advanced nuclear technology, principally Ontario, New Brunswick, New York, and Tennessee, as if to say, “Why can’t we be like them?” All four have a subsidized state or federally owned utility company whose purpose is to develop and operate power plants. New York has an extensive energy research and development authority that is directly involved in product development. Furthermore, large entities like the Tennessee Valley Authority and Ontario Power Generation have the financial wherewithal and extraordinary subsidies to afford spending $5.5 billion on a 300-megawatt plant from GE-Hitachi.

Maine is a very different animal. We have no state power generation utility, and we prohibit private generation utilities in Maine. When Maine talks about adding new generation technologies to its energy supply mix, it means purchasing electricity from a third-party owner/operator who has bought a commercial power plant to generate it. So, unlike the TVA example, for a GE-Hitachi 300 MW SMR to happen in Maine, GE-Hitachi will have to achieve a commercially viable product that some owner/operator can afford to buy at a price that allows them to supply electricity to the state at competitive rates. GE-Hitachi will have to reduce its current unit price by at least two-thirds for its product to be helpful to any third-party operator. This could be achievable at some point in the future- the question is, how long will it take them to do that?

The questions of who the owner-operator might be and what technology the owner-operator buys to provide electricity to the State apply to all emerging energy technologies, not just SMRs. And there are many potential technologies beyond SMRs, including two types of fusion, wave and tidal marine energy conversion, algae-based biofuels, high-temperature fuel cells, advanced geothermal, microreactors, multiple new energy storage/battery technologies, and advanced solar photovoltaic systems. This is a partial list for early 2026, and it will change over time.

The job of the Department of Energy Resources is not to bet on new technologies or presume winners or losers, but to develop plans and strategies to procure affordable electricity from third parties that meet state goals through comprehensive reviews and analyses of the marketplace. The language approved by the majority of the EUT requires them to do just that.

None of this logic rejects the idea that SMRs may, at some point in the future, be one of the sources for Maine’s energy mix. We do need to acknowledge, though, that SMRs compete with a range of other sources, and the timing of third parties buying and operating SMRs to provide competitively priced electricity is very uncertain.

Rejecting the term “nuclear” in the statute language is therefore an acknowledgement of good policy development that recognizes how product commercialization proceeds among energy technology development, the time it takes for a technically feasible product to become commercially viable, as well as the unique circumstances under which Maine must plan its energy future. That’s not ideology, but good planning and management.

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Small Modular Reactors: Betting the Grid or Hedging the Odds?

Small modular reactors (SMRs) have been heralded for more than a decade as the next big breakthrough in nuclear power — compact, factory-built reactors that can be deployed faster and more cheaply than the megaprojects of the past. Advocates claim they will provide reliable, zero-carbon baseload power that balances renewables. But a fundamental question remains: what are the odds that SMRs will actually be economically viable in the United States by 2035?

Economically viable means:

· Repeatable build time ≤ 5 years from decision to invest in a project;

· All-in LCOE ≤ $70–90/MWh (firm, dispatchable);

· ≥ 2–3 GW of firm orders (not just MOUs), i.e., commercial traction beyond one First of a kind (FOAK).

To answer that, we applied a Bayesian framework: begin with a prior assumption about the likelihood of success, then update that probability as new evidence is introduced. The calculation involves the following equation:

Odds of achieving question = Guess of odds without further evidence x (likelihood ratios for each element of new evidence, multiplied together)

Starting Point

We began with a neutral 50% prior probability that SMRs will succeed — essentially a coin toss. This reflects the “hype vs. skepticism” balance in the public debate, without assuming either optimism or pessimism.

From there, we assessed each of five leading U.S. developers — GE Hitachi, NuScale, TerraPower, X-Energy, and Kairos — and applied likelihood ratios based on four evidence categories:

  1. Licensing familiarity (light-water vs. advanced designs)
  2. Fuel availability (conventional uranium vs. HALEU)
  3. First-of-a-kind delivery risk (track record on cost and schedule)
  4. Financing and policy support (access to capital and federal backing)

Updating the Odds

GE Hitachi (BWRX-300):

  • Strong NRC pathway, multiple international projects, conventional fuel.
  • Posterior probability: ~20–25%.

NuScale (VOYGR):

  • NRC-certified, but credibility hit by canceled Utah project and rising costs.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–8%.

TerraPower (Natrium):

  • DOE- and Gates-backed, but dependent on HALEU and unproven sodium cooling.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–7%.

X-Energy (Xe-100):

  • Pebble-bed design with DOE support, industrial heat niche, but HALEU-dependent.
  • Posterior probability: ~5–6%.

Kairos:

  • Very early stage, novel salt-cooled approach, highest technical and fuel risk.
  • Posterior probability: ~2–3%.

Aggregate Outlook

When combining across all five players, the probability that at least one company delivers an economically viable SMR by 2035 comes out to:

  • Planning Case (balanced assumptions): ~33–40%
  • Conservative Case (heavier weight on FOAK and fuel risks): ~20–25%
  • Optimistic Case (favorable licensing and supply chain development): ~45–50%
  • Base Case (all evidence considered at current weightings): ~8–10%

So, while the starting point was a coin flip, the evidence pushes the odds downward.

Why the Probabilities Matter

  1. Fuel bottleneck: Three of five contenders rely on HALEU fuel, which has no established commercial U.S. supply chain. Without it, those designs are stuck.
  2. Licensing realities: Light-water SMRs (GEH, NuScale) are advantaged, but even they face long NRC timelines and FOAK delivery risk.
  3. Financing risk: Private capital remains wary until a second or third unit demonstrates on-time, on-budget delivery.
  4. Competing technologies: Solar, wind, and storage costs keep falling, raising the bar for SMR competitiveness.

Policy Implications

  • Policymakers should treat SMRs as a hedged option — worth monitoring and supporting at the R&D and demo level, but not as a guaranteed pillar of decarbonization.
  • Long-range resource planning should assign low-to-moderate probability weightings to SMRs becoming competitive by 2035.
  • The near-term focus should remain on proven tools — renewables, storage, demand flexibility, and transmission — while maintaining optionality for nuclear if credible evidence emerges.

The Takeaway

Using these assumptions, by 2035, there is at best a one-in-three chance that a U.S. SMR will prove both technically and economically viable. Among the contenders, GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 stands out as the most credible, while others face steeper hurdles.

The Bayesian math underscores what intuition already suggests: SMRs are possible, but far from certain. Betting the grid on them would be a gamble; treating them as a long-shot option while focusing on proven, scalable solutions is the prudent play.

Of course, it’s all about the assumptions. Spreadsheet for this calculation available on request.