Maine’s Narrow Window to Get Data Centers Right

Maine’s debate over a data center moratorium bill (LD 307) drew national and even international attention, along with intense local political engagement. That phase is over. The bill was vetoed, and the Governor has established a Maine Data Center Advisory Council, a cross-agency and stakeholder group tasked with recommending a regulatory framework by January 29, 2027. The focus has now shifted to a bigger question: what comes next?

Data centers are expanding rapidly and represent significant new electricity demand. Their scale creates challenges for infrastructure planning, cost allocation, and system reliability that existing processes were not designed to handle. The executive order makes clear that the veto did not reject this premise—it changed the mechanism, not the objective.

Maine does not currently have a comprehensive regulatory framework capable of addressing these projects. Existing rules—interconnection procedures, utility service requirements, environmental permitting—do apply, but each evaluates a single dimension of a project. None were built to assess facilities that simultaneously affect wholesale markets, transmission systems, local distribution networks, land use, water resources, and long-term rates. And nothing in the current structure requires those impacts to be evaluated together.

The executive order begins to address that gap. It directs agencies to protect ratepayers, avoid stranded infrastructure, and ensure that costs are borne by those who create them. It also brings energy, environmental, economic, and stakeholder perspectives into a single process.

These are necessary steps. But they do not resolve the central issue LD 307 was designed to address: sequencing.

LD 307 would have created time to build a framework before large-scale development proceeds. The executive order allows development to continue while that framework is being developed. With the council’s report not due until late January 2027, with any resulting legislation and rulemaking coming after, Maine will rely largely on its existing, incomplete structure for at least the next year and a half, a path that carries real risk.

What has happened in other states illustrates that risk when development happens before rules are put in place. Virginia, Ohio, and Oregon revised rate structures after projects were underway. Georgia and Indiana imposed minimum demand charges and take-or-pay provisions only after excess capacity created stranded-cost exposure. In some cases, states acted only after impacts became unavoidable. Key issues remain unresolved, including disputes over transmission cost allocation and federal concern about reliability risks tied to concentrated demand.

The scale of these projects explains why. A single large data center can require hundreds of megawatts of electricity, comparable to adding a small city to the grid. In Maine, one project could increase peak demand in CMP’s territory by 10% or more, and far more in Versant’s territory. These are system-shaping decisions with real economic impacts to all ratepayers.

This is not an argument against data centers. Properly structured, they can support economic development and contribute to grid flexibility. The outcome depends on whether Maine establishes a framework before the tradeoffs such projects require are locked in.

For the Council to succeed, it must move quickly from general principles to enforceable structure: a coordinated process for evaluating large-load interconnections; a rigorous, scenario-based test for ratepayer impact; integration with Maine’s Integrated Grid Planning process; and clear standards for environmental and community impacts. It must also distinguish between fundamentally different project types rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach.

But the period before that framework is complete is just as important. If projects move forward without coordinated oversight, the council will be reacting to outcomes rather than shaping them.

That is where discipline is required. State agencies, working with the Governor, should use the authority they already have to slow the pace of large-scale approvals and closely coordinate decisions with the council. When the council delivers its recommendations, the Legislature should act promptly to codify a clear, durable framework in law.

LD 307 was about sequencing: framework first, development second. That objective has not changed. The mechanism has. The question now is whether Maine can move quickly and deliberately enough to stay ahead of the market.

CMP Wants $189 Million More. Here’s What the Filing Doesn’t Tell Us.

(The following is based on comments I filed with the PUC)

Central Maine Power is asking for a $189 million increase in annual revenue, which is about a 17% hike. The reasons are familiar: stronger storms, more electricity use from heat pumps and electric vehicles, aging infrastructure, and more rooftop solar. These are real challenges, and Maine’s grid does need investment. But that’s just part of the story.

The real question is whether we are making the right investments at the right cost, and if the system holds anyone accountable for the results. This filing raises serious concerns on that front.

You May Hear “Rates Are Going Down.” That’s Not Exactl;y What’s Happening.

Some reports about this filing suggest customers might see a small drop in their electric bills this summer. That’s technically true, but it’s also misleading. The reason is simple: your electric bill has two main parts.

  • The supply charge (the cost of electricity itself) is set by regional markets.
  • The distribution charge (the cost of delivering power) is set in this case.

Right now, supply prices are expected to drop temporarily. That reduction would happen whether this rate case existed or not. At the same time, CMP is proposing to increase distribution rates, which is the part they control.

When those two things happen at once, you can get a short-term net decrease. But that doesn’t mean rates are actually going down. It means one part of your bill is temporarily going down. The part CMP controls is going up, and that increase is what this case is about.

The Big Picture Is Right. The Details Are Not.

CMP released a long-term Integrated Grid Plan (IGP) in late 2025, then filed this rate case in April 2026. Both agree that the grid needs to be strengthened, expanded, and modernized. But just pointing in the same direction is not the same as making a clear, evidence-based case. The filing relies heavily on the IGP to justify its investments, but it doesn’t clearly show:

  • Which specific grid problems does each investment solve?
  • Whether the timing of those investments matches actual system needs
  • Whether lower-cost alternatives were seriously considered

That last point is critical.

In many cases, reliability problems can be solved without building new infrastructure. Tools like demand response, battery storage, or shifting electricity use can help. These are called “non-wires alternatives,” and they can often lower costs and improve flexibility. There is little evidence in this filing that those options were meaningfully evaluated before defaulting to traditional construction. It is not clear we are choosing the right solutions at the right cost.

Our Utility Accountability Framework Has Real Weaknesses

Maine’s regulatory system is supposed to link utility spending to performance. This filing shows that connection is not working as intended.

First, performance targets aren’t improving.
CMP’s main reliability metric, SAIFI (which measures outages per customer), has not changed since 2022. Recent data shows CMP is already missing that target, yet the company is asking for $189 million in new investment. If customers are paying more, it’s fair to expect better performance. Right now, that expectation isn’t built into the system.

Second, storm costs are based on past events, not future needs.
CMP wants to raise storm costs in base rates from $14.1 million to $53.1 million per year, which is nearly four times higher. This is based on a five-year average that includes some of the worst storms on record. But if the proposed investments work, and stronger infrastructure and better vegetation management reduce damage, then future storm costs should go down. Locking in costs based on the most extreme recent years risks overcharging customers for improvements that are supposed to lower those costs.

Third, the rate structure itself creates upward pressure.
This case will set the starting point for future multi-year rates. That creates an incentive: the higher the starting point, the higher rates will stay in the years that follow. Without clear safeguards, this setup can quietly push costs higher over time.

What This Means for You

This isn’t about being for or against grid investment. We need to invest. The real question is whether the system ensures:

  • We only build what we actually need
  • We choose the lowest-cost solution that works
  • We hold utilities accountable for results
  • We don’t lock in unnecessary costs

Right now, the system doesn’t consistently do that.

What the PUC Should Do

Maine needs to invest in its electric grid. The direction CMP is taking, toward resilience, capacity, and modernization, is generally right.

But the process needs to ensure that:

  • Investments are chosen from a real set of alternatives, not assumptions.
  • Major cost drivers, including affiliate charges, are fully transparent.
  • Performance improves as spending increases.
  • Future costs reflect expected results, not just past extremes.

What I Will Be Working On Next Session

The Legislature should:

  • Require a clear, enforceable link between long-term grid plans and the rate cases that follow, so utilities must demonstrate exactly how each investment addresses a defined need and why it is the lowest-cost option;
  • Update Maine’s performance-based framework to require measurable improvement in reliability and resilience as a condition of approving new spending. Storm cost recovery should be tied to expected future outcomes, not just historical averages; and
  • Establish guardrails around multi-year rate plans to prevent the initial rate case from setting an artificially high baseline for years to come.

The Bottom Line

Maine ratepayers are being asked to fund a major transformation of the electric grid.

That will only work if the system ensures discipline, transparency, and accountability.

Right now, the system doesn’t consistently do that, and this filing makes that clear.

Maine Needs a Better Plan for its Electricity Grid

by Kay Aikin and Gerry Runte, Published in the Press Herald, October 6, 2025

Kay Aikin is CEO of Dynamic Grid in Portland and a member of the U.S. Department of Energy Grid Wise Architecture Council. Rep. Gerry Runte, D-York, is in his second term in the Maine Legislature, representing parts of Wells and York as well as the town of Ogunquit. He serves on the Energy, Utilities and Technology Joint Committee.

Mainers pay some of the highest electricity bills in the country. Now, Central Maine Power wants to raise those bills by another $35 per month by 2031 to fund infrastructure and workforce upgrades. While investments in reliability and resilience are essential, the proposed increase, on top of recent years’ hikes, has rightly been called “massive and unacceptable” by Gov. Mills.

CMP’s request is a symptom of a deeper problem: Maine lacks a strategic plan for modernizing its electricity grids in a way that ensures affordability, reliability and climate alignment. Without such a plan, we’ll continue to lurch from rate case to rate case, locking in costs for ratepayers while missing opportunities to invest wisely.

Yes, we need stronger poles and more line workers. But we also need a new way of thinking about the grid itself, one that recognizes that today’s grid is no longer just wires and substations. It is more than the sum of its parts; it is a network of homes, businesses and communities equipped with solar panels, heat pumps, batteries, EV chargers and smart thermostats.

These distributed energy resources (DERs) are no longer optional; they are the building blocks of a clean, reliable and affordable energy future. Yet CMP’s proposal focuses on conventional infrastructure, ignoring lower-cost, customer-centered alternatives.

Maine’s regulatory framework has not yet caught up. Integrated Distribution Planning is underway at the Public Utilities Commission; however, the process is currently fragmented and reactive. Utilities file plans in isolation, regulators respond in silos and the long-term vision gets lost. CMP’s rate case is the latest example of a utility advancing costly investments without a clear roadmap for the grid’s long-term future.

Maine needs a better way to make decisions. That’s why we support establishing a long-range grid planning group in law, with the authority and independence to chart a more innovative course and put affordability, equity and climate at the center. This group should:

  • Build on existing planning but move beyond piecemeal proceedings.
  • Apply principles of Clean Capital Efficiency, maximizing the use of existing infrastructure before building new.
  • Map out where DERs and targeted upgrades can reduce costs and improve reliability.
  • Develop a 10-year roadmap with measurable performance standards.
  • Include utilities, regulators, consumer advocates, labor, DER providers and community representatives — ensuring transparency and trust.

These goals are not radical ideas, but common-sense economic solutions that could delay or downsize major infrastructure investments, saving ratepayers money while making the grid more resilient.

It’s essential that Maine establish a planning group within the Public Utilities Commission to redesign the way we plan, regulate and value distributed energy. This group would:

  • Be community-informed, prioritizing equity and rural inclusion.
  • Redesign compensation to reward customer participation in grid services.
  • Chart a path for utilities to evolve their business models and support distributed energy, unlocking its full value.
  • Apply systems thinking to anticipate rather than react to change.

Other countries, such as Australia, have achieved this with great success. Their early investment in systems-based planning has enabled them to become global leaders in DER integration. Maine doesn’t need to copy their model, but we should learn from their method.

CMP’s rate hike proposal should be a wake-up call. Maine must stop treating grid investments as one-off fights. Regulators must ask: Are these projects reducing long-term costs? Are we maximizing the grid we have? Are we valuing the role of customers?

If the answer is no, we need to pause. Mainers deserve a strategy, not another surprise.

Done right, this group will provide lawmakers, regulators and utilities with the evidence-based guidance to make smarter choices. It will replace reactive spending with proactive strategy. It will build public trust that facts, not politics, are guiding our energy future. Let’s create the smarter, more affordable energy future Maine needs — before we lock in another decade of regrets.

Good Energy Policy Is Technology-Agnostic

On January 6, the Energy, Utilities, and Technology (EUT) Committee of the Maine Legislature debated amendments to a bill that would require the PUC to obtain “informational bids” on small modular reactors (SMRs) for use in Maine. The bill was rejected by the majority and amended to require the Department of Energy Resources to carefully assess the commercial readiness of all emerging energy technologies for use in the State Energy Plan. SMRs are just one of many technically feasible technologies that are not yet commercial. and that list of possibile technologies will change over time as some drop off and others are added. Statutes need to be durable, and the choice of technology-agnostic language is essential. However, the debate in the EUT focused on the inclusion of the word “nuclear” and the presumption on the part of the minority members that SMRs are indeed the frontrunners among emerging technologies. Some might see the majority’s action as driven by anti-nuclear ideology. Nothing could be further from the truth. and taking that view misses a fundamental difference about energy sources in Maine – we are buyers of the output of power plants owned and operated by third parties, which purchase equipment from manufacturers. Here’s why that makes a difference.

There was considerable discussion about the activities of other states and provinces regarding advanced nuclear technology, principally Ontario, New Brunswick, New York, and Tennessee, as if to say, “Why can’t we be like them?” All four have a subsidized state or federally owned utility company whose purpose is to develop and operate power plants. New York has an extensive energy research and development authority that is directly involved in product development. Furthermore, large entities like the Tennessee Valley Authority and Ontario Power Generation have the financial wherewithal and extraordinary subsidies to afford spending $5.5 billion on a 300-megawatt plant from GE-Hitachi.

Maine is a very different animal. We have no state power generation utility, and we prohibit private generation utilities in Maine. When Maine talks about adding new generation technologies to its energy supply mix, it means purchasing electricity from a third-party owner/operator who has bought a commercial power plant to generate it. So, unlike the TVA example, for a GE-Hitachi 300 MW SMR to happen in Maine, GE-Hitachi will have to achieve a commercially viable product that some owner/operator can afford to buy at a price that allows them to supply electricity to the state at competitive rates. GE-Hitachi will have to reduce its current unit price by at least two-thirds for its product to be helpful to any third-party operator. This could be achievable at some point in the future- the question is, how long will it take them to do that?

The questions of who the owner-operator might be and what technology the owner-operator buys to provide electricity to the State apply to all emerging energy technologies, not just SMRs. And there are many potential technologies beyond SMRs, including two types of fusion, wave and tidal marine energy conversion, algae-based biofuels, high-temperature fuel cells, advanced geothermal, microreactors, multiple new energy storage/battery technologies, and advanced solar photovoltaic systems. This is a partial list for early 2026, and it will change over time.

The job of the Department of Energy Resources is not to bet on new technologies or presume winners or losers, but to develop plans and strategies to procure affordable electricity from third parties that meet state goals through comprehensive reviews and analyses of the marketplace. The language approved by the majority of the EUT requires them to do just that.

None of this logic rejects the idea that SMRs may, at some point in the future, be one of the sources for Maine’s energy mix. We do need to acknowledge, though, that SMRs compete with a range of other sources, and the timing of third parties buying and operating SMRs to provide competitively priced electricity is very uncertain.

Rejecting the term “nuclear” in the statute language is therefore an acknowledgement of good policy development that recognizes how product commercialization proceeds among energy technology development, the time it takes for a technically feasible product to become commercially viable, as well as the unique circumstances under which Maine must plan its energy future. That’s not ideology, but good planning and management.

Energy Policy in the Age of Narrative Risk

How misinformation has become a significant risk in Maine’s energy debates

Designing long-term energy policy is never simple. Planners must account for uncertain fuel prices, changing weather patterns, evolving technology, economic cycles, regulations, and politics. Even at its best, energy planning is an exercise in managing incomplete information and revisiting assumptions as conditions change.

That challenge is not new. What is new is the growing influence of organized misinformation and disinformation campaigns in energy debates. Unlike fuel price volatility or weather uncertainty, this risk is artificial. These campaigns and narratives are designed to shape public perception, harden positions, and overwhelm careful analysis before it can be evaluated.

People’s beliefs influence which facts they trust and Ideology plays a central role. When energy policy becomes entangled with identity or values, evidence alone often fails to persuade. In those cases, misinformation doesn’t need to invent new ideas; it simply reinforces existing ones.

A recent national campaign targeting offshore wind illustrates this pattern. It did not succeed by disproving science. Instead, it aligned its messaging with broader skepticism about government institutions, regulation, and environmental policy. Scientific rebuttals followed, but they were slow, fragmented, and ineffective among audiences already predisposed to distrust the messenger. The narratives of whale deaths, negative impacts on fisheries, and reliability claims took hold well before they were conclusively proven false.

Maine has seen this offshore wind dynamic play out on other energy topics as well, in debates over the NECEC transmission project, Pine Tree Power, community solar, and broader clean energy policy. Strong disagreement is normal and health in a democracy. What is new is how often these debates drift away from shared facts and trusted processes toward competing stories grounded in ideology rather than evidence.

Energy policy is especially vulnerable to this problem because it sits at the intersection of money, land use, climate, and power. People on all sides often believe they are following the facts, yet they rely on different sources, interpret uncertainty differently, and distrust the same institutions meant to resolve factual disputes. The result is not persuasion, but entrenchment.

Consider how demonstrably false or misleading claims have taken root in Maine: that solar policy is the primary cause of high electricity rates; that renewable energy threatens grid reliability; that Pine Tree Power would guarantee billions in savings; that all Quebec hydropower flows only to Massachusetts; or that hydropower is inherently “dirty.” These claims persist because they align with deeper beliefs about markets, government, expertise, or environmentalism.

This is not a problem confined to one political party or ideology. It occurs whenever energy debates become proxies for larger cultural or political battles. Once that happens, additional data rarely changes outcomes—not because people are unreasonable, but because the disagreement is no longer really about facts.

Regulators, courts, agencies, campaigns, and the press all play essential roles. But none are designed to function as neutral referees of public facts once debates turn political. By the time formal decisions are issued or court rulings are handed down, trust is often already lost.

That gap allows uncertainty to be weaponized and competing narratives to flourish unchecked. Policy outcomes then depend as much on how information spreads as on its accuracy.

Energy decisions shape Maine’s economy, environment, and household budgets. Allowing those decisions to be driven by viral misinformation—whether from the right or the left—comes with real costs. That risk is not hypothetical or off in the future – we are now entering a new election cycle where false narratives can sway ballot outcomes, resulting in the election of officials who implement policies with lasting disastrous effects. It’s already happening at the federal level, and not just on energy policy.

Maine does not need unanimity on energy policy. It does need a shared factual foundation. As Garrison Keillor once observed, modern political debates resemble book club meetings where none of the attendees have read the same book. A public or private, trusted, nonpartisan energy fact-checking entity could help restore productive debate—and ensure that Maine’s energy decisions are grounded in reality, not rhetoric.

Energy Supply Is a Portfolio, Not a Party Platform

In many ways, energy supply planning shares many of the attributes of building and managing an investment portfolio because it, too, involves organizing assets – the various types of power plant options to generate electricity. Each of these assets have varying risk profiles, cost structures, and performance characteristics, and are combined to optimize reliability, affordability, and resilience. Following the analogy with an invetment portfolio, solar functions as high-growth daytime equity, wind as an overnight international index fund, hydro as a stable bond, nuclear as long-duration Treasuries, and storage as the options contract that manages volatility. Natural gas serves as emergency liquidity for market shocks. Each asset performs differently depending on season, market conditions, and system stress. Planners are responsible for designing a risk-minimized, reliability-optimized portfolio that ensures stable costs and uninterrupted service. While no portfolio manager would consider investing in a single stock a viable strategy, this approach is sometimes mistakenly accepted in political discussions.

These considerations should remain nonpartisan and technical. Engineers evaluate energy systems based on objective metrics such as forced-outage rate, marginal operating cost, and locational marginal price, rather than perceived moral value. Energy systems operate according to physical laws, not political ideologies. If a wind turbine or natural gas plant fails, the grid is unaffected by political preferences.

The investment portfolio is constructed to achieve the desired level of risk in the market. How risk is treated in energy supply is where politics enter the picture. After planners develop an optimized resource mix that meets reliability standards and minimizes system-wide costs, society must determine which risks are acceptable and which should be avoided. Some stakeholders view decarbonization as a way to reduce risk and prefer portfolios weighted toward low-carbon assets, while others see intermittent resources as a reliability concern. Some consider nuclear energy a long-term hedge, whereas others regard it as an unacceptable liability. In this context, politics reflects the point at which stakeholders say, “I understand this is the rational portfolio… but here is how I perceive the risks.” These perspectives are not incorrect; they represent qualitative judgments layered onto quantitative models.

Problems arise when political ideology distorts an objective analysis, especially when driven by misinformation. This occurs when individuals hew to a certain political perspective and advocate for an energy grid powered exclusively by renewables, nuclear, or fossil fuels, or reject out of hand other technologies without fully understanding how that source fits within the overall portfolio. A resilient grid, like a resilient portfolio, depends on diversification. It recognizes that each asset has strengths and weaknesses, and that overconcentration is quickly penalized by real-world conditions. Markets reward balance, not ideology. And misinformation can corrupt the outcome.

Ultimately, an energy strategy is neither a moral identity nor a partisan loyalty test. It is a long-term asset allocation challenge conducted under uncertainty, with significant consequences for millions of people. Planners and engineers should be entrusted to construct the optimal risk-balanced portfolio. Once the model provides a recommended allocation, the key question remains: Does this portfolio reflect your definition and perception of risk?

Small Modular Reactors: Betting the Grid or Hedging the Odds?

Small modular reactors (SMRs) have been heralded for more than a decade as the next big breakthrough in nuclear power — compact, factory-built reactors that can be deployed faster and more cheaply than the megaprojects of the past. Advocates claim they will provide reliable, zero-carbon baseload power that balances renewables. But a fundamental question remains: what are the odds that SMRs will actually be economically viable in the United States by 2035?

Economically viable means:

· Repeatable build time ≤ 5 years from decision to invest in a project;

· All-in LCOE ≤ $70–90/MWh (firm, dispatchable);

· ≥ 2–3 GW of firm orders (not just MOUs), i.e., commercial traction beyond one First of a kind (FOAK).

To answer that, we applied a Bayesian framework: begin with a prior assumption about the likelihood of success, then update that probability as new evidence is introduced. The calculation involves the following equation:

Odds of achieving question = Guess of odds without further evidence x (likelihood ratios for each element of new evidence, multiplied together)

Starting Point

We began with a neutral 50% prior probability that SMRs will succeed — essentially a coin toss. This reflects the “hype vs. skepticism” balance in the public debate, without assuming either optimism or pessimism.

From there, we assessed each of five leading U.S. developers — GE Hitachi, NuScale, TerraPower, X-Energy, and Kairos — and applied likelihood ratios based on four evidence categories:

  1. Licensing familiarity (light-water vs. advanced designs)
  2. Fuel availability (conventional uranium vs. HALEU)
  3. First-of-a-kind delivery risk (track record on cost and schedule)
  4. Financing and policy support (access to capital and federal backing)

Updating the Odds

GE Hitachi (BWRX-300):

  • Strong NRC pathway, multiple international projects, conventional fuel.
  • Posterior probability: ~20–25%.

NuScale (VOYGR):

  • NRC-certified, but credibility hit by canceled Utah project and rising costs.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–8%.

TerraPower (Natrium):

  • DOE- and Gates-backed, but dependent on HALEU and unproven sodium cooling.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–7%.

X-Energy (Xe-100):

  • Pebble-bed design with DOE support, industrial heat niche, but HALEU-dependent.
  • Posterior probability: ~5–6%.

Kairos:

  • Very early stage, novel salt-cooled approach, highest technical and fuel risk.
  • Posterior probability: ~2–3%.

Aggregate Outlook

When combining across all five players, the probability that at least one company delivers an economically viable SMR by 2035 comes out to:

  • Planning Case (balanced assumptions): ~33–40%
  • Conservative Case (heavier weight on FOAK and fuel risks): ~20–25%
  • Optimistic Case (favorable licensing and supply chain development): ~45–50%
  • Base Case (all evidence considered at current weightings): ~8–10%

So, while the starting point was a coin flip, the evidence pushes the odds downward.

Why the Probabilities Matter

  1. Fuel bottleneck: Three of five contenders rely on HALEU fuel, which has no established commercial U.S. supply chain. Without it, those designs are stuck.
  2. Licensing realities: Light-water SMRs (GEH, NuScale) are advantaged, but even they face long NRC timelines and FOAK delivery risk.
  3. Financing risk: Private capital remains wary until a second or third unit demonstrates on-time, on-budget delivery.
  4. Competing technologies: Solar, wind, and storage costs keep falling, raising the bar for SMR competitiveness.

Policy Implications

  • Policymakers should treat SMRs as a hedged option — worth monitoring and supporting at the R&D and demo level, but not as a guaranteed pillar of decarbonization.
  • Long-range resource planning should assign low-to-moderate probability weightings to SMRs becoming competitive by 2035.
  • The near-term focus should remain on proven tools — renewables, storage, demand flexibility, and transmission — while maintaining optionality for nuclear if credible evidence emerges.

The Takeaway

Using these assumptions, by 2035, there is at best a one-in-three chance that a U.S. SMR will prove both technically and economically viable. Among the contenders, GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 stands out as the most credible, while others face steeper hurdles.

The Bayesian math underscores what intuition already suggests: SMRs are possible, but far from certain. Betting the grid on them would be a gamble; treating them as a long-shot option while focusing on proven, scalable solutions is the prudent play.

Of course, it’s all about the assumptions. Spreadsheet for this calculation available on request.

Anti-Science Policies Threaten Our Health — and Our Energy Future

(updated 9/24/25)

Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s views on medicine have garnered considerable attention since he assumed leadership of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Public health experts warn that implementing his anti-science views on vaccines and autism, as well as the elimination of vital research, will create a national health emergency. They’re right to be alarmed. Unfortunately, RFK Jr. is not the only ideologue appointed by the White House. Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Wright is also promoting policies inconsistent with established science and technology, and Mainers are not immune from their consequences.

Secretary Wright and the outsiders he has brought into DOE, as well as the President himself, have made public statements and issued reports divorced from modern science and the current state of energy technology. DOE recently issued two reports that have come under considerable criticism. One was a bizarre compendium of all the climate science denier cliches of the last 20 years. The other, regarding grid reliability and power sources, was directly at odds with our current understanding of optimum operation of electricity grids and role of clean energy sources. Instead of listening to its own experts, DOE promotes an energy policy right out of the Nixon administration centered on building large fossil power plants to meet unrealistically high projections of demand, expecting just over the horizon nuclear plants to deliver power too cheap to meter.

Proposed transmission lines that better distribute power regionally have been blocked, expensive coal plants scheduled for retirement are being kept open, measures that make far better use of our existing power lines are ignored, and new energy sources that reduce the cost of power are being eliminated. The consequences of these disastrous policies are painfully clear: higher electricity bills, a less reliable grid, and increasing environmental costs.

The playbook is familiar: sideline the experts, replace facts with pseudo-science, and repeat myths until doubt sets in. The tobacco industry used this strategy to deter anti-smoking campaigns. Climate deniers have used it for decades. And now we see it in federal agencies.

But repetition gives these myths staying power. Just as RFK’s DHHS entertains unsubstantiated theories about medicine, DOE has opened its doors to an ideology that only fits politically selective perspectives. Once ideology drives the agenda, it is challenging to pull policy back to evidence, and ordinary Americans pay the price.

Many of these federal false narratives about energy are being echoed for adoption here in Maine, and Mainers can’t afford them. Every state in New England faces high electricity prices – driven not by renewable energy, but by reliance on expensive natural gas and delays in building grid infrastructure. Should the DOE’s mythologies make their way into Maine’s energy policy, we will all be worse off.

That’s why Mainers must be alert to disinformation coming out of Washington and repeated here at home. When you hear claims that renewables can’t keep the lights on and drive up costs, that accepted forms of utility regulation and rate design are political scams, or that climate change is exaggerated, remember these are not facts. They are the energy equivalents of denying the efficacy of vaccines or promoting unsupported theories about autism causes and cures.

The answer isn’t complicated. It’s a fact, not ideology, that adding clean sources of power and storage, along with modernizing the grid and enacting regulatory reforms, are the cheapest and cleanest ways to run our economy and make our grid more reliable.

When we ignore science in health, people get sick. When we ignore science and technology in energy, people pay more, suffer more outages, the economy falters, and the climate crisis worsens. Either way, families carry the burden.

We cannot let ideology replace evidence in health or energy policy. Maine deserves leaders who will stand up for facts over fiction, solutions over soundbites, and evidence over ideology. Whether it’s our health or our electricity, science-based policy isn’t just the smart path forward. It’s the only path.

Maine’s New Department of Energy Resources

I sponsored a bill that creates a Department of Energy Resources for Maine, LD 1270, which was signed into law on July 1. The following is my floor speech urging its enactment.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the House:

I support LD 1270, “An Act to Establish the Department of Energy Resources,” as amended. This bill restructures how Maine develops, promulgates, and implements energy policy. It mirrors language in the Governor’s budget proposal and establishes a cabinet-level Department of Energy Resources by transferring and enhancing the responsibilities currently held by the Governor’s Energy Office into this new Department.

At its core, this bill concerns applying sound management principles to the State of Maine’s approach to energy policy.

Now, we all understand that government and business have different objectives. Corporations measure success by profit and return on investment. Governments, by contrast, are responsible for public outcomes—things like affordability, reliability, and environmental responsibility. But while the goals may differ, the fundamentals of good management—clear accountability, coordinated action, and structured decision-making—are essential to both.

Mr. Speaker – That’s what LD 1270 is all about.

LD 1270 responds to a real organizational challenge. Over the years, we’ve created energy initiatives through multiple pieces of legislation, each assigning responsibility to different agencies. The result is a patchwork of programs—well-intentioned but fragmented. Our energy policy is a sum of many parts, without a clear home or structure to ensure it all works together. This bill would fix that by creating a durable, cabinet-level department with comprehensive oversight, allowing for more coherent planning, clearer lines of accountability, and better alignment of state efforts with regional and federal initiatives.

Like any well-run organization, the Department will operate with a clear plan. The State Energy Plan will serve as the guidepost for everything from electricity procurement to clean energy development and workforce planning. A significant responsibility of the Department is to keep this plan updated and ensure its implementation, incorporating public input and coordinating with entities like the Efficiency Maine Trust and the Department of Environmental Protection. This plan provides the context and direction for all aspects of energy initiatives – grid planning, procurement of clean energy supplies, and management of electricity demand.  

Establishing the Department gives us a better-equipped structure to evaluate emerging technologies, respond to market changes, and deliver on policy goals with greater clarity and consistency. It strengthens the link between planning and execution while keeping regulatory oversight in place.

The legislation lays out a transparent framework for how the Department will conduct competitive solicitations, guided by the State Energy Plan, to ensure adequate energy supply while controlling energy costs and building Maine’s energy economy. This procurement framework includes clear criteria for bidder eligibility, a defined process for evaluating proposals, requirements for public input, and coordination with the Office of the Public Advocate. These are not symbolic gestures—they are functional requirements designed to ensure that ratepayer benefit, not speculation or preference, underlies procurement decisions.

The bill also carefully maintains a strong role for the Public Utilities Commission. The Department will conduct solicitations for energy resources, but the Commission must ultimately approve those contracts. This separation of responsibilities is essential. It ensures that energy procurement remains grounded in a regulatory process that puts ratepayer value first. The Department can identify opportunities; the Commission must confirm that those opportunities are in the public interest.

In addition, the bill outlines workforce and equity standards that apply to selected projects. It maximizes employment opportunities for Maine residents, including those from disadvantaged communities. These standards are realistic, not aspirational. They reflect existing practices in state-funded infrastructure and align our energy investments with broader economic goals.

This bill is not about creating something new for its own sake. It is about organizing what we already do more effectively so that policy goals are implemented through a clear, coordinated, and accountable structure. This bill is merely the application of basic organizational management principles.

For those reasons, I respectfully urge you to vote “ought to pass as amended.”

Thank you.