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Good Energy Policy Is Technology-Agnostic

On January 6, the Energy, Utilities, and Technology (EUT) Committee of the Maine Legislature debated amendments to a bill that would require the PUC to obtain “informational bids” on small modular reactors (SMRs) for use in Maine. The bill was rejected by the majority and amended to require the Department of Energy Resources to carefully assess the commercial readiness of all emerging energy technologies for use in the State Energy Plan. SMRs are just one of many technically feasible technologies that are not yet commercial. and that list of possibile technologies will change over time as some drop off and others are added. Statutes need to be durable, and the choice of technology-agnostic language is essential. However, the debate in the EUT focused on the inclusion of the word “nuclear” and the presumption on the part of the minority members that SMRs are indeed the frontrunners among emerging technologies. Some might see the majority’s action as driven by anti-nuclear ideology. Nothing could be further from the truth. and taking that view misses a fundamental difference about energy sources in Maine – we are buyers of the output of power plants owned and operated by third parties, which purchase equipment from manufacturers. Here’s why that makes a difference.

There was considerable discussion about the activities of other states and provinces regarding advanced nuclear technology, principally Ontario, New Brunswick, New York, and Tennessee, as if to say, “Why can’t we be like them?” All four have a subsidized state or federally owned utility company whose purpose is to develop and operate power plants. New York has an extensive energy research and development authority that is directly involved in product development. Furthermore, large entities like the Tennessee Valley Authority and Ontario Power Generation have the financial wherewithal and extraordinary subsidies to afford spending $5.5 billion on a 300-megawatt plant from GE-Hitachi.

Maine is a very different animal. We have no state power generation utility, and we prohibit private generation utilities in Maine. When Maine talks about adding new generation technologies to its energy supply mix, it means purchasing electricity from a third-party owner/operator who has bought a commercial power plant to generate it. So, unlike the TVA example, for a GE-Hitachi 300 MW SMR to happen in Maine, GE-Hitachi will have to achieve a commercially viable product that some owner/operator can afford to buy at a price that allows them to supply electricity to the state at competitive rates. GE-Hitachi will have to reduce its current unit price by at least two-thirds for its product to be helpful to any third-party operator. This could be achievable at some point in the future- the question is, how long will it take them to do that?

The questions of who the owner-operator might be and what technology the owner-operator buys to provide electricity to the State apply to all emerging energy technologies, not just SMRs. And there are many potential technologies beyond SMRs, including two types of fusion, wave and tidal marine energy conversion, algae-based biofuels, high-temperature fuel cells, advanced geothermal, microreactors, multiple new energy storage/battery technologies, and advanced solar photovoltaic systems. This is a partial list for early 2026, and it will change over time.

The job of the Department of Energy Resources is not to bet on new technologies or presume winners or losers, but to develop plans and strategies to procure affordable electricity from third parties that meet state goals through comprehensive reviews and analyses of the marketplace. The language approved by the majority of the EUT requires them to do just that.

None of this logic rejects the idea that SMRs may, at some point in the future, be one of the sources for Maine’s energy mix. We do need to acknowledge, though, that SMRs compete with a range of other sources, and the timing of third parties buying and operating SMRs to provide competitively priced electricity is very uncertain.

Rejecting the term “nuclear” in the statute language is therefore an acknowledgement of good policy development that recognizes how product commercialization proceeds among energy technology development, the time it takes for a technically feasible product to become commercially viable, as well as the unique circumstances under which Maine must plan its energy future. That’s not ideology, but good planning and management.

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Energy Policy in the Age of Narrative Risk

How misinformation has become a significant risk in Maine’s energy debates

Designing long-term energy policy is never simple. Planners must account for uncertain fuel prices, changing weather patterns, evolving technology, economic cycles, regulations, and politics. Even at its best, energy planning is an exercise in managing incomplete information and revisiting assumptions as conditions change.

That challenge is not new. What is new is the growing influence of organized misinformation and disinformation campaigns in energy debates. Unlike fuel price volatility or weather uncertainty, this risk is artificial. These campaigns and narratives are designed to shape public perception, harden positions, and overwhelm careful analysis before it can be evaluated.

People’s beliefs influence which facts they trust and Ideology plays a central role. When energy policy becomes entangled with identity or values, evidence alone often fails to persuade. In those cases, misinformation doesn’t need to invent new ideas; it simply reinforces existing ones.

A recent national campaign targeting offshore wind illustrates this pattern. It did not succeed by disproving science. Instead, it aligned its messaging with broader skepticism about government institutions, regulation, and environmental policy. Scientific rebuttals followed, but they were slow, fragmented, and ineffective among audiences already predisposed to distrust the messenger. The narratives of whale deaths, negative impacts on fisheries, and reliability claims took hold well before they were conclusively proven false.

Maine has seen this offshore wind dynamic play out on other energy topics as well, in debates over the NECEC transmission project, Pine Tree Power, community solar, and broader clean energy policy. Strong disagreement is normal and health in a democracy. What is new is how often these debates drift away from shared facts and trusted processes toward competing stories grounded in ideology rather than evidence.

Energy policy is especially vulnerable to this problem because it sits at the intersection of money, land use, climate, and power. People on all sides often believe they are following the facts, yet they rely on different sources, interpret uncertainty differently, and distrust the same institutions meant to resolve factual disputes. The result is not persuasion, but entrenchment.

Consider how demonstrably false or misleading claims have taken root in Maine: that solar policy is the primary cause of high electricity rates; that renewable energy threatens grid reliability; that Pine Tree Power would guarantee billions in savings; that all Quebec hydropower flows only to Massachusetts; or that hydropower is inherently “dirty.” These claims persist because they align with deeper beliefs about markets, government, expertise, or environmentalism.

This is not a problem confined to one political party or ideology. It occurs whenever energy debates become proxies for larger cultural or political battles. Once that happens, additional data rarely changes outcomes—not because people are unreasonable, but because the disagreement is no longer really about facts.

Regulators, courts, agencies, campaigns, and the press all play essential roles. But none are designed to function as neutral referees of public facts once debates turn political. By the time formal decisions are issued or court rulings are handed down, trust is often already lost.

That gap allows uncertainty to be weaponized and competing narratives to flourish unchecked. Policy outcomes then depend as much on how information spreads as on its accuracy.

Energy decisions shape Maine’s economy, environment, and household budgets. Allowing those decisions to be driven by viral misinformation—whether from the right or the left—comes with real costs. That risk is not hypothetical or off in the future – we are now entering a new election cycle where false narratives can sway ballot outcomes, resulting in the election of officials who implement policies with lasting disastrous effects. It’s already happening at the federal level, and not just on energy policy.

Maine does not need unanimity on energy policy. It does need a shared factual foundation. As Garrison Keillor once observed, modern political debates resemble book club meetings where none of the attendees have read the same book. A public or private, trusted, nonpartisan energy fact-checking entity could help restore productive debate—and ensure that Maine’s energy decisions are grounded in reality, not rhetoric.

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Energy Supply Is a Portfolio, Not a Party Platform

In many ways, energy supply planning shares many of the attributes of building and managing an investment portfolio because it, too, involves organizing assets – the various types of power plant options to generate electricity. Each of these assets have varying risk profiles, cost structures, and performance characteristics, and are combined to optimize reliability, affordability, and resilience. Following the analogy with an invetment portfolio, solar functions as high-growth daytime equity, wind as an overnight international index fund, hydro as a stable bond, nuclear as long-duration Treasuries, and storage as the options contract that manages volatility. Natural gas serves as emergency liquidity for market shocks. Each asset performs differently depending on season, market conditions, and system stress. Planners are responsible for designing a risk-minimized, reliability-optimized portfolio that ensures stable costs and uninterrupted service. While no portfolio manager would consider investing in a single stock a viable strategy, this approach is sometimes mistakenly accepted in political discussions.

These considerations should remain nonpartisan and technical. Engineers evaluate energy systems based on objective metrics such as forced-outage rate, marginal operating cost, and locational marginal price, rather than perceived moral value. Energy systems operate according to physical laws, not political ideologies. If a wind turbine or natural gas plant fails, the grid is unaffected by political preferences.

The investment portfolio is constructed to achieve the desired level of risk in the market. How risk is treated in energy supply is where politics enter the picture. After planners develop an optimized resource mix that meets reliability standards and minimizes system-wide costs, society must determine which risks are acceptable and which should be avoided. Some stakeholders view decarbonization as a way to reduce risk and prefer portfolios weighted toward low-carbon assets, while others see intermittent resources as a reliability concern. Some consider nuclear energy a long-term hedge, whereas others regard it as an unacceptable liability. In this context, politics reflects the point at which stakeholders say, “I understand this is the rational portfolio… but here is how I perceive the risks.” These perspectives are not incorrect; they represent qualitative judgments layered onto quantitative models.

Problems arise when political ideology distorts an objective analysis, especially when driven by misinformation. This occurs when individuals hew to a certain political perspective and advocate for an energy grid powered exclusively by renewables, nuclear, or fossil fuels, or reject out of hand other technologies without fully understanding how that source fits within the overall portfolio. A resilient grid, like a resilient portfolio, depends on diversification. It recognizes that each asset has strengths and weaknesses, and that overconcentration is quickly penalized by real-world conditions. Markets reward balance, not ideology. And misinformation can corrupt the outcome.

Ultimately, an energy strategy is neither a moral identity nor a partisan loyalty test. It is a long-term asset allocation challenge conducted under uncertainty, with significant consequences for millions of people. Planners and engineers should be entrusted to construct the optimal risk-balanced portfolio. Once the model provides a recommended allocation, the key question remains: Does this portfolio reflect your definition and perception of risk?

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Small Modular Reactors: Betting the Grid or Hedging the Odds?

Small modular reactors (SMRs) have been heralded for more than a decade as the next big breakthrough in nuclear power — compact, factory-built reactors that can be deployed faster and more cheaply than the megaprojects of the past. Advocates claim they will provide reliable, zero-carbon baseload power that balances renewables. But a fundamental question remains: what are the odds that SMRs will actually be economically viable in the United States by 2035?

Economically viable means:

· Repeatable build time ≤ 5 years from decision to invest in a project;

· All-in LCOE ≤ $70–90/MWh (firm, dispatchable);

· ≥ 2–3 GW of firm orders (not just MOUs), i.e., commercial traction beyond one First of a kind (FOAK).

To answer that, we applied a Bayesian framework: begin with a prior assumption about the likelihood of success, then update that probability as new evidence is introduced. The calculation involves the following equation:

Odds of achieving question = Guess of odds without further evidence x (likelihood ratios for each element of new evidence, multiplied together)

Starting Point

We began with a neutral 50% prior probability that SMRs will succeed — essentially a coin toss. This reflects the “hype vs. skepticism” balance in the public debate, without assuming either optimism or pessimism.

From there, we assessed each of five leading U.S. developers — GE Hitachi, NuScale, TerraPower, X-Energy, and Kairos — and applied likelihood ratios based on four evidence categories:

  1. Licensing familiarity (light-water vs. advanced designs)
  2. Fuel availability (conventional uranium vs. HALEU)
  3. First-of-a-kind delivery risk (track record on cost and schedule)
  4. Financing and policy support (access to capital and federal backing)

Updating the Odds

GE Hitachi (BWRX-300):

  • Strong NRC pathway, multiple international projects, conventional fuel.
  • Posterior probability: ~20–25%.

NuScale (VOYGR):

  • NRC-certified, but credibility hit by canceled Utah project and rising costs.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–8%.

TerraPower (Natrium):

  • DOE- and Gates-backed, but dependent on HALEU and unproven sodium cooling.
  • Posterior probability: ~6–7%.

X-Energy (Xe-100):

  • Pebble-bed design with DOE support, industrial heat niche, but HALEU-dependent.
  • Posterior probability: ~5–6%.

Kairos:

  • Very early stage, novel salt-cooled approach, highest technical and fuel risk.
  • Posterior probability: ~2–3%.

Aggregate Outlook

When combining across all five players, the probability that at least one company delivers an economically viable SMR by 2035 comes out to:

  • Planning Case (balanced assumptions): ~33–40%
  • Conservative Case (heavier weight on FOAK and fuel risks): ~20–25%
  • Optimistic Case (favorable licensing and supply chain development): ~45–50%
  • Base Case (all evidence considered at current weightings): ~8–10%

So, while the starting point was a coin flip, the evidence pushes the odds downward.

Why the Probabilities Matter

  1. Fuel bottleneck: Three of five contenders rely on HALEU fuel, which has no established commercial U.S. supply chain. Without it, those designs are stuck.
  2. Licensing realities: Light-water SMRs (GEH, NuScale) are advantaged, but even they face long NRC timelines and FOAK delivery risk.
  3. Financing risk: Private capital remains wary until a second or third unit demonstrates on-time, on-budget delivery.
  4. Competing technologies: Solar, wind, and storage costs keep falling, raising the bar for SMR competitiveness.

Policy Implications

  • Policymakers should treat SMRs as a hedged option — worth monitoring and supporting at the R&D and demo level, but not as a guaranteed pillar of decarbonization.
  • Long-range resource planning should assign low-to-moderate probability weightings to SMRs becoming competitive by 2035.
  • The near-term focus should remain on proven tools — renewables, storage, demand flexibility, and transmission — while maintaining optionality for nuclear if credible evidence emerges.

The Takeaway

Using these assumptions, by 2035, there is at best a one-in-three chance that a U.S. SMR will prove both technically and economically viable. Among the contenders, GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 stands out as the most credible, while others face steeper hurdles.

The Bayesian math underscores what intuition already suggests: SMRs are possible, but far from certain. Betting the grid on them would be a gamble; treating them as a long-shot option while focusing on proven, scalable solutions is the prudent play.

Of course, it’s all about the assumptions. Spreadsheet for this calculation available on request.

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Anti-Science Policies Threaten Our Health — and Our Energy Future

(updated 9/24/25)

Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s views on medicine have garnered considerable attention since he assumed leadership of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Public health experts warn that implementing his anti-science views on vaccines and autism, as well as the elimination of vital research, will create a national health emergency. They’re right to be alarmed. Unfortunately, RFK Jr. is not the only ideologue appointed by the White House. Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Wright is also promoting policies inconsistent with established science and technology, and Mainers are not immune from their consequences.

Secretary Wright and the outsiders he has brought into DOE, as well as the President himself, have made public statements and issued reports divorced from modern science and the current state of energy technology. DOE recently issued two reports that have come under considerable criticism. One was a bizarre compendium of all the climate science denier cliches of the last 20 years. The other, regarding grid reliability and power sources, was directly at odds with our current understanding of optimum operation of electricity grids and role of clean energy sources. Instead of listening to its own experts, DOE promotes an energy policy right out of the Nixon administration centered on building large fossil power plants to meet unrealistically high projections of demand, expecting just over the horizon nuclear plants to deliver power too cheap to meter.

Proposed transmission lines that better distribute power regionally have been blocked, expensive coal plants scheduled for retirement are being kept open, measures that make far better use of our existing power lines are ignored, and new energy sources that reduce the cost of power are being eliminated. The consequences of these disastrous policies are painfully clear: higher electricity bills, a less reliable grid, and increasing environmental costs.

The playbook is familiar: sideline the experts, replace facts with pseudo-science, and repeat myths until doubt sets in. The tobacco industry used this strategy to deter anti-smoking campaigns. Climate deniers have used it for decades. And now we see it in federal agencies.

But repetition gives these myths staying power. Just as RFK’s DHHS entertains unsubstantiated theories about medicine, DOE has opened its doors to an ideology that only fits politically selective perspectives. Once ideology drives the agenda, it is challenging to pull policy back to evidence, and ordinary Americans pay the price.

Many of these federal false narratives about energy are being echoed for adoption here in Maine, and Mainers can’t afford them. Every state in New England faces high electricity prices – driven not by renewable energy, but by reliance on expensive natural gas and delays in building grid infrastructure. Should the DOE’s mythologies make their way into Maine’s energy policy, we will all be worse off.

That’s why Mainers must be alert to disinformation coming out of Washington and repeated here at home. When you hear claims that renewables can’t keep the lights on and drive up costs, that accepted forms of utility regulation and rate design are political scams, or that climate change is exaggerated, remember these are not facts. They are the energy equivalents of denying the efficacy of vaccines or promoting unsupported theories about autism causes and cures.

The answer isn’t complicated. It’s a fact, not ideology, that adding clean sources of power and storage, along with modernizing the grid and enacting regulatory reforms, are the cheapest and cleanest ways to run our economy and make our grid more reliable.

When we ignore science in health, people get sick. When we ignore science and technology in energy, people pay more, suffer more outages, the economy falters, and the climate crisis worsens. Either way, families carry the burden.

We cannot let ideology replace evidence in health or energy policy. Maine deserves leaders who will stand up for facts over fiction, solutions over soundbites, and evidence over ideology. Whether it’s our health or our electricity, science-based policy isn’t just the smart path forward. It’s the only path.

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Maine’s New Department of Energy Resources

I sponsored a bill that creates a Department of Energy Resources for Maine, LD 1270, which was signed into law on July 1. The following is my floor speech urging its enactment.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the House:

I support LD 1270, “An Act to Establish the Department of Energy Resources,” as amended. This bill restructures how Maine develops, promulgates, and implements energy policy. It mirrors language in the Governor’s budget proposal and establishes a cabinet-level Department of Energy Resources by transferring and enhancing the responsibilities currently held by the Governor’s Energy Office into this new Department.

At its core, this bill concerns applying sound management principles to the State of Maine’s approach to energy policy.

Now, we all understand that government and business have different objectives. Corporations measure success by profit and return on investment. Governments, by contrast, are responsible for public outcomes—things like affordability, reliability, and environmental responsibility. But while the goals may differ, the fundamentals of good management—clear accountability, coordinated action, and structured decision-making—are essential to both.

Mr. Speaker – That’s what LD 1270 is all about.

LD 1270 responds to a real organizational challenge. Over the years, we’ve created energy initiatives through multiple pieces of legislation, each assigning responsibility to different agencies. The result is a patchwork of programs—well-intentioned but fragmented. Our energy policy is a sum of many parts, without a clear home or structure to ensure it all works together. This bill would fix that by creating a durable, cabinet-level department with comprehensive oversight, allowing for more coherent planning, clearer lines of accountability, and better alignment of state efforts with regional and federal initiatives.

Like any well-run organization, the Department will operate with a clear plan. The State Energy Plan will serve as the guidepost for everything from electricity procurement to clean energy development and workforce planning. A significant responsibility of the Department is to keep this plan updated and ensure its implementation, incorporating public input and coordinating with entities like the Efficiency Maine Trust and the Department of Environmental Protection. This plan provides the context and direction for all aspects of energy initiatives – grid planning, procurement of clean energy supplies, and management of electricity demand.  

Establishing the Department gives us a better-equipped structure to evaluate emerging technologies, respond to market changes, and deliver on policy goals with greater clarity and consistency. It strengthens the link between planning and execution while keeping regulatory oversight in place.

The legislation lays out a transparent framework for how the Department will conduct competitive solicitations, guided by the State Energy Plan, to ensure adequate energy supply while controlling energy costs and building Maine’s energy economy. This procurement framework includes clear criteria for bidder eligibility, a defined process for evaluating proposals, requirements for public input, and coordination with the Office of the Public Advocate. These are not symbolic gestures—they are functional requirements designed to ensure that ratepayer benefit, not speculation or preference, underlies procurement decisions.

The bill also carefully maintains a strong role for the Public Utilities Commission. The Department will conduct solicitations for energy resources, but the Commission must ultimately approve those contracts. This separation of responsibilities is essential. It ensures that energy procurement remains grounded in a regulatory process that puts ratepayer value first. The Department can identify opportunities; the Commission must confirm that those opportunities are in the public interest.

In addition, the bill outlines workforce and equity standards that apply to selected projects. It maximizes employment opportunities for Maine residents, including those from disadvantaged communities. These standards are realistic, not aspirational. They reflect existing practices in state-funded infrastructure and align our energy investments with broader economic goals.

This bill is not about creating something new for its own sake. It is about organizing what we already do more effectively so that policy goals are implemented through a clear, coordinated, and accountable structure. This bill is merely the application of basic organizational management principles.

For those reasons, I respectfully urge you to vote “ought to pass as amended.”

Thank you.

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A Clean Energy Standard for Maine

In June, Maine enacted LD 1868, “An Act to Advance a Clean Energy Economy by Updating Renewable and Clean Resource Procurement Laws” The following are my remarks to the House in support of this bill.

I rise today in strong support of LD 1868, which is a necessary evolution in how we define and pursue our clean energy goals in Maine.

Maine’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, or RPS, was adopted in 1999 to support hydro and biomass generation. In 2007, we expanded it to include wind and solar, setting a 10% renewable energy goal by 2030. In 2019, we raised that target to 80%. We ultimately established a goal of 100% zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

These were all important milestones. This year, with the release of the State Energy Plan, we were able to take a more expansive perspective on how we achieve our goals.

 LD 1868 adds Clean Energy Standard sources to our target at 1% per year, beginning in 2031, with an additional 1 percent each year until it achieves 10% of our portfolio by 2040.

The reality is this: while the terms “renewable” and “zero GHG” were once treated as interchangeable, we know that not all renewable sources are zero-emission, and not all zero-emission technologies are renewable.  Biomass, for example, is renewable, but its greenhouse gas profile depends on the feedstock. On the other hand, advanced thermal processes or clean hydrogen fuel cells may produce near-zero emissions, but they don’t qualify as renewable under our current rules.

This leads us to the logic behind LD 1868 and the Clean Energy Standard, or CES.

Mr. Speaker: Rather than limiting ourselves to a fixed list of technologies, as we do under the RPS, the CES asks a different question:

Does the electricity source reduce greenhouse gas emissions?  If the source can meet the test of being zero or near-zero GHG and clean, determined by verifiable performance criteria to be established by the DEP, it can qualify—whether it’s fusion, advanced geothermal, hydrogen, or next-generation nuclear, or even technologies that haven’t been commercialized yet.

We are planning for a future more than a decade away. We know there are multiple ways to reach our emissions targets.  e challenge is we don’t yet know which mix of technologies will get us there most efficiently or economically.  The technologies we’ll rely on in 2040 or 2050 may not even be fully developed today. A technology-neutral standard gives us technology diversity, the flexibility we need, and a much greater likelihood of success.

LD 1868 is a smart, measured step in the right direction. It gives us the structure and vision to expand what’s possible without abandoning the progress we’ve already made.

Mr. Speaker, LD 1868 is not about abandoning our commitment to renewables. It’s about aligning our tools with our goals, ensuring that as we move forward, we stay focused on what really matters: affordable, reliable, and low-carbon energy for Maine’s future. It gives us the structure and vision to expand what’s possible, building on the progress we’ve already made.

I urge you to join me in voting ought to pass.

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Enhancing Distribution Grid Planning

I sponsored a bill, LD 1726, “An Act to Enhance the Coordination and Effectiveness of Integrated Distribution Grid Planning” which was signed into law on June 12. The following is my presentation to the House:

The process for planning our local electric distribution grid is one of the most important tools we have to meet Maine’s goals for electricity affordability, reliability, resilience, and climate.  This bill aims to achieve a higher level of coordination among multiple agencies and initiatives that influence the grid planning process.

A distribution grid plan is a blueprint for building and maintaining the local grid, determining the optimum way to serve our growing needs for electricity, whether through new infrastructure, reducing demand, or adding local generation that avoids the need for new power plants. It also seeks to optimize how that grid operates, minimizing new investments, allowing the grid to operate more like a network and permitting far higher utilization of the wires that are there, ensuring that the grid operates at maximum capacity.

Every single one of these factors directly impacts what customers pay for electricity.

Over the last 6 years the state has begun multiple initiatives and strategies that impact grid planning, conducted by several state agencies, such as electrification, energy storage, demand management, and new energy procurements. They all tend to be managed as distinct programs, sometimes without formal coordination.  Many have a direct impact on grid plans

This bill does not alter the current planning cycle but applies to future cycles. I see this bill as a “tune-up” of the process to better coordinate and manage future planning.

Consistency of forecast methods. The forecast of load is an essential element to grid plans. 

The bill ensures that forecast methodologies used by the grid planning process and state agencies are consistent with the Energy Plan when possible.

Integration of new technologies improving efficiency of grid operation. There are now technologies that improve the efficiency and reliability of the grid. With them we can get more power to consumers using the existing grid reducing the need for new power sources. For example, the Governor’s Energy Office is pursuing a program that uses software and hardware to enhance grid stability, regulate voltage, and increase transmission capacity on existing lines. Additionally, the bill encourages the incorporation of grid monitoring measures through the use of sensors checking for power quality, reliability, state of the infrastructure, and distributed generation output. The bill promotes their use and incorporation in grid plans.

Coordination of grid plans into power procurement decisions. When procurements of local power sources are conducted in isolation from the grid planning process, unintended consequences can occur.

Maine has already experienced this in its solar program through procurements that did not optimize project location to minimize infrastructure investments. While some level of coordination among agencies that direct procurement does occur, there is no formal requirement for close linkage between the attributes of these procurements and grid plans. The bill ensures such coordination occurs.

Review of Non Wires Alternative Program. In the 129th, legislation established a “nonwires alternative” program, requiring proposals for new infrastructure to serve demand to consider alternatives such as meeting that demand with local power sources or managing that demand through load control and efficiency measures. Nonwire alternatives and demand management are in fact essential tools used to formulate a grid plan. Currently the PUC is in charge of the planning process, the lead for non-wire alternatives is in the Office of Consumer Advocate, and the lead for demand management is Efficiency Maine. The bill requires the three agencies involved to assess the current situation and develop recommendations on how that process could be improved.

As to arguments that greater coordination between the State Energy Plan and grid planning erodes the independence of the PUC- Its independence is preserved through its quasi-judicial function. Infrastructure investment, and new technology introduction, as well as energy procurements, are policy-driven questions, and it is appropriate that our legislatively mandated energy plan guide that direction. And they all directly impact grid planning.

By integrating the energy plan into the planning process, we ensure that grid investments are not made in a policy vacuum or create costly unintended consequences, as what happened in the disconnect with early solar procurements and infrastructure planning. The energy plan itself is subject to public input, legislative review, and regular updates, offering transparency and accountability. In contrast, a purely utility-initiated planning process can lack clear public priorities or coordination across sectors.

Increased coordination with the state energy plan enhances—rather than compromises—the quality and legitimacy of grid planning. It grounds utility decisions in a broader public interest framework, while preserving the PUC’s neutral role in reviewing and approving those decisions.

In summary, LD 1726 is a collection of measures to improve the grid planning process and strengthen the coordination between Maine’s energy agencies and the planning process by strengthening its governance by establishing more formal linkages to activities that have a direct impact on, or perhaps should be subject to, the findings of a grid plan.

LD 1726 is just good management. I urge a vote for “Ought to Pass.”

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Rethinking Grid Reliability in New England: Beyond the Outdated Notion of Baseload Power

For years, grid reliability has been locked into an outdated framework that sees power generation as a rigid hierarchy. In this model, baseload power plants, typically coal, nuclear, or large hydro, provide the system’s foundation. Intermediate plants ramp up as demand rises, and peaker plants fire to handle extreme conditions. This rigid sequence has shaped how we plan, regulate, and invest in electricity infrastructure.

However, clinging to this traditional model is holding us back. Thanks to new technology, smart energy management, and flexible power use, we now have better ways to keep the grid stable—especially in New England, where winter storms, high electricity costs, and limited natural gas supply complicate energy planning.

A recent Duke University study, Rethinking Load Growth, offers critical insight into how large electricity loads like data centers, industrial electrification, and managed demand response, when operated flexibly, can actually enhance reliability and minimize the need for new power plants. Instead of obsessing over the diminishing role of traditional baseload power, the New England grid should embrace this dynamic, adaptive reliability model—one where flexible demand, smart grid coordination, and intelligent load balancing take center stage.

Myth: Renewable Energy is “Unreliable”

Critics of renewable energy often argue that wind and solar threaten reliability because they are “intermittent.” The logic goes that the grid will become unstable without a steady supply of fossil or nuclear power running 24/7. But this fear is rooted in an outdated view of how electricity systems function. The grid does not operate on a simple “always-on” philosophy—it is a highly dynamic system, constantly responding to shifting conditions in supply and demand.

In reality, all power sources are variable—not just renewables. A nuclear plant can experience an unexpected outage. Gas-fired power plants depend on pipeline infrastructure that can freeze or fail, as New England has experienced during extreme cold snaps. Even coal plants have been forced offline due to fuel supply chain disruptions. The notion that “baseload” is inherently reliable is not just misleading—it’s dangerous. In fact, a little over a year ago, the CEO of ISO-NE testified before FERC that reliability would be solid for the next several years, in part because of wind and solar energy and the diversity they add to generation sources.

The Rethinking Load Growth report makes clear that the best path forward is a more flexible, adaptive grid—not a rigid one. Instead of fixating on the predictability of individual power sources, we should focus on the predictability of the system as a whole—and that means integrating smart, real-time demand-side management alongside renewable energy.

A Smarter Way to Keep the Lights On

One of the report’s key findings is that ISO-New England (ISO-NE) and other grid operators already have significant headroom to integrate new large loads without requiring massive new investments in power plants or transmission lines. The study estimates that over 100 GW of flexible load could be integrated nationally with only minimal curtailment of operations.

This is a game-changer for reliability. Instead of assuming that the grid must always meet demand instantaneously with generation, a flexibility-first approach allows demand to adjust in response to grid conditions. AI-driven data centers, intelligent HVAC systems, and automated industrial processes can ramp up or down in real time, smoothing variability without requiring new fossil fuel infrastructure.

For New England, where winter peak demand is driven by heating loads and constrained natural gas supply, this flexibility could mean the difference between stability and blackouts. Instead of burning more fossil fuels, grid operators could shift demand dynamically—pre-heating buildings when renewable supply is abundant, temporarily reducing non-essential loads during peak hours, or leveraging stored energy from electric vehicle fleets.

Smart Grids and Distributed Resources: A Reliable Future

Beyond flexible loads, smart grid technologies and distributed energy resources (DERs) further redefine reliability. Microgrids, battery storage, rooftop solar, and virtual power plants (VPPs) allow for localized energy balancing, reducing dependence on centralized fossil fuel plants.

For example, instead of relying on peaker plants to handle extreme winter cold, ISO-NE could integrate neighborhood-level microgrids powered by a combination of distributed solar, storage, and demand response. When centralized plants are under strain, these localized systems can continue operating—enhancing resilience at a fraction of the cost of new power plants.

Moreover, real-time grid monitoring, AI-driven forecasting, and automated control systems can now predict and respond precisely to fluctuations, which was unthinkable in the old “baseload-first” model. Instead of designing a system that assumes worst-case demand scenarios, we can create one that dynamically adapts to reality.

The Future of the Grid: Smart, Not Rigid

Like other regional grid operators, ISO-New England is beginning to embrace this new paradigm to ensure long-term reliability. That means continuing to:

· Expand demand flexibility programs to reduce peak load strain.

· Modernize how it ensures power plants are available when necessary.

· Invest in real-time grid intelligence to better integrate renewables and flexible loads.

· Facilitate growth of distributed energy resources to enhance local resilience.

It’s time to abandon the hierarchical, generation-first view of reliability that has dominated grid planning for over a century. Grid reliability is no longer about keeping big power plants running 24/7—it’s about using energy in smarter ways. With the right policies, New England and its electric utilities can embrace a clean, flexible, cost-effective energy system that works for the 21st century. We now have the technology, data, and tools to orchestrate a cleaner, cheaper, and more reliable grid than the legacy fossil-based system.

It’s time to leave outdated ideas behind and build a resilient, adaptable system that is ready for anything. The answer is clear: reliability is no longer about baseload but real-time adaptability.

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Nuclear Energy Revival Unlikely, Especially in Maine

As reported in a recent article in the Portland Press Herald (“Nuclear power is making a comeback in the U.S. But not in Maine.” 12/1/2024), over the last few months, the media has been abuzz with reports about restarting old nuclear reactors and a growing interest among tech investors in “small modular reactors” (SMRs). While the public might interpret this as a general trend toward nuclear power, restarting older nuclear plants, like Three Mile Island Unit 1, is an entirely different venture from the ambitious efforts of startups attempting to commercialize SMR technologies. And none are viable options for Maine for the next decade, if ever.

Let’s first deal with the restart of old reactors. Most of the operating nuclear plants in the US entered service with costs that far exceeded initial estimates and required substantial upgrade investments to remain operational. Electricity customers were often saddled with these expenses, sometimes even paying for plants long after their owners took them out of service. Just last year, the only new nuclear plant to be commissioned in four decades came online with costs five to ten times higher than acceptable alternatives, a burden that Georgia ratepayers will carry for decades.

Those plants that might be restarted were taken offline because they became too expensive to compete with cheaper alternatives in their respective markets. Their owners have found single customers willing to pay a premium for their electricity, eliminating their need to compete in the marketplace. While avoiding market risk, the plant owners still face the potential of expensive component replacements in the future. Fortunately, plant owners and their contracted electricity purchasers will bear the risk, not utility ratepayers.

SMRs fall into two broad categories: those based on “light water reactor” designs similar to current nuclear plants and those in the “exotic” category, which include molten salt coolants, fuels that contain more fissile isotopes and require higher energy neutron radiation fields. The financial risks of SMRs, borne entirely by private investors, mirror those of most emerging technologies: challenges in securing ongoing investment, failure to complete federal licensing, uneconomic designs, delayed timelines, and, in some cases, products that ultimately fail to perform as needed for competitive market entry.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website tracks SMR project licensing, offering details on where these companies stand in the licensing process. In the light water SMR category, only one of the four light water developers, NuScale, achieved design certification last year after a 14-year effort. Immediately after certification, The others are far behind, Shortly after getting its design certification, NuScale announced that their projected costs would be far higher than anticipated, making them uneconomic in most markets, and that they were unlikely to deliver units when promised. NuScale’s stock plummeted and earlier this year they laid off a quarter of their staff and shifted its focus to Romania. Assuming NuScale stays afloat, a US operating license for its first product is still at least a decade away. Among the exotic SMR designs, three companies have applied for test reactor construction permits. Test reactors are important, but still very early in the path to an actual licensed economic product. Since the 1950s, about 20 fast reactor test units have operated, but none proved economical. The current administration in Washington has vowed to eliminate IRA subsidies, which potentially make or break whether or not these new technologies will be economic.

As with the older reactors, the financial risks of SMR development, regardless of the technology, fall entirely on the investors rather than on ratepayers. For SMR developers, the most pressing risk is the potential loss of investor backing before reaching viability. The nuclear industry and at least one political lobbying organization have been conducting a public relations campaign to promote the notion that SMRs are on the brink of success, offering low-cost energy solutions. There are two agendas for this message. First, giving the illusion of near-term viability buoys wary investors worried they would never see a payout. The other agenda is that by making SMRs seem imminent, less attention would be paid to clean technologies, thereby enhancing the continued use of fossil fuels.

So what about Maine? Restarting old reactors is out of the question for Maine. For SMRs in the future, three requirements will have to be met. First, an economically competitive and licensed SMR product needs to be available. NuScale is the front-runner, provided it overcomes its financial woes. Still, it is at least a decade away from such a product. The others, including the fast reactor variants, are way behind. The second requirement would be for a non-utility owner-operator to step forward since Maine electric utilities are not allowed to own power plants. Every new commercial nuclear plant built in the US has been utility-owned because they are uniquely positioned to manage the significant financial risk of delay and costs. Finally, since 1985, the construction of any new nuclear reactors in Maine must be approved by a public referendum (Title 35-A §4302).

The recent wave of nuclear promotion, whether restarting old plants or investing in SMR R&D—reflects a renewed push to reframe nuclear as part of a sustainable energy future. However, each path carries distinct risks and benefits. The high operational costs of restarting existing plants are only justifiable if long-term contracts pay them a premium. For SMRs, substantial investment risks fall on private investors hoping for breakthroughs in cost and technology. Both approaches require caution, transparency, and realistic expectations. While nuclear energy may offer potential benefits in terms of clean energy, its viability in the future energy mix depends entirely on whether the financial and operational challenges of each of its various technologies can be overcome. Commercial nuclear power will, therefore, not be part of Maine’s electricity future, and counting on its contribution runs the risk of delaying or deferring affordable and available actions.

Finally, you might note that this is all about commercial viability, economics and market decisions. The collapse of the industry in the US, as well as any future it might have are due to those factors and had little to do with public risk perception, waste disposal or environmental concerns.